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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of agency governs the relations between principals, agents,
and third persons.' A portion of that body of law deals with the
liabilities that arise when an agent causes harm to a third party.2
Situations in which negligent employees cause harm to their employers'
customers are ripe for the application of standard agency principles.'
Those principles dictate that the employer will be liable for the tort of an
employee if the tort is committed in the scope of employment.4
The Restatement (Second) ofAgency and case law provide many illu-
strations. If an employer directs an employee to perform a certain task
and the employee mistakenly completes a different one, and in doing so
negligently harms another, the employer is liable.5 Or if an employee
* B.A., 1975, Mount Holyoke College; J.D., 1986, Nova Southeastern University Shepard
Broad Law Center, Assistant Professor, Duquesne University Law School. Professor Spyke is a co-
author of a recently published casebook dealing with notary law. See MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL.,
NOTARY LAW AND PRACTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS (National Notary Association 1997). The
Author wishes to thank her colleagues at Duquesne for their valuable guidance in the preparation
of this Article, particularly Dean Nicholas P. Cafardi and Professor Kellen McClendon. She also
wishes to thank Bridget A. Murray, J.D., 1997, Duquesne University Law School, for her assistance.
1. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFAGENCY § 1 (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; J. S.
COVINGTON, INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 1 (1988); Rosco T. STEPHAN,
AGENCY-PARTNERSHIP IN A NUTSHELL § 1 (1977).
2. See generally, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch. 7; 2 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF AGENCY, §§ 1855-2018 (2d ed. 1982).
3. The Restatement provisions are cast in terms of "masters" and "servants," while other
agency texts refer to "principals" and "agents." See generally MECHEM, supra note 2. According
to Mechem, the principal-agent relationship refers to situations where an individual (the agent) is
a business representative of another (the principal) and where the expectation is that the agent will
make contact with third persons to make contracts for the principal's benefit. See Id. § 36.
Servants, on the other hand, are those employed to perform services for their employers or masters
without any expectation that they will enter into contracts for the master. See Id. Mechem explains
that although this distinction is clear, it is not treated so by the courts; for the most part, however,
the difference is not crucial, since the rules governing principals and agents and masters and
servants are very much alike. See id § 38. The Restatement states that full-time employees are
servants, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch. 7, topic 2, tit. B., introductory note, and further
explains that "[a] master is a species of principal, and a servant is a species of agent." Id. § 2 cmt.
a. Notary employees will fit the definition of servant when they act to serve their employers.
Because the use of"master" and "servant" has declined over the years, see MECHEM, supra note
2, § 38, this Article, except when specifically referring to Restatement provisions, will use the terms
"employer" and "employee."
4. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 219.
5. See id § 229 cmt. a, illus. 1. This example presupposes that the employee was acting
within the scope of employment. An employer will not be liable, however, if the employee's act is
done with the intent to disobey the employer. See Id § 235 cmt. a, illus. 2.
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uses a personal car for employment purposes and the employer pays for
the car's upkeep, then the employer is subject to liability if the employ-
ee, while on the job, causes harm to another while negligently driving
the car.' An employer would also be liable if it employs a full-time
nurse who negligently attends to an injured third party while at work.
The employer's liability for a third party's harm arises even though
the employer is not negligent. Instead, the law of agency provides that
"liability is normally based upon the fact that the tort is brought about
in the course of an undertaking for the benefit, and subject to the ight,
of the principal to control his servant."8 It is this type of liability-also
referred to as vicarious liability or respondeat superior-with which this
Article is concerned.9
Consider a slightly different example: A bank secretary who is a
notary public ° takes the acknowledgment of a signature on a document
that is generated as part of a bank transaction. The secretary negligently
fails to require the acknowledging party to appear before her. There-
after, the party whose acknowledgment purportedly appeared on the
document claims that the signature was forged, and a third party who
relied on the acknowledgment suffers harm. Should the bank be liable
for the secretary-notary's negligence? Should it make a difference if the
bank manager coerced the notary employee to take the invalid acknow-
ledgment?
The addition of a notary employee to the factual scenario complicates
the legal analysis to a significant extent. For a number of reasons, some
courts and state statutes have restricted the application of vicarious
liability when the offending tortfeasor is a notary employee." Other
courts and at least one state's statute, however, embrace traditional
agency principles. 2 The law's inconsistency causes confusion and has
undesirable consequences. Jurisdictions that reject the application of
6. See id § 239 cmt. b, illus. 3.
7. See Dickerson v. American Sugar ReE Co., 211 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 1954). An
employer will be liable for damage to contractual or business interests if the employer
unintentionally authorizes conduct by an employee that results in a tort. See REsTATENT, supra
note 1, § 215 and cmt. c.
8. RESTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 216 cmt. a.
9. See Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Miller, 451 N.E.2d 1099,1102 ([nd. Ct. App. 1983)
(referring to liability imposed on a master for the torts of a servant as respondent superior); McVay
v. Rich, 859 P.2d 399, 403 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (defining vicarious liability as the liability
imposed on one individual for the acts of another, "based solely on a relationship beteen the two
persons" (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990)).
10. For the balance of this Article the terms "notary" and "notaries" mill be used to refer to
a notary public and notaries public, respectively.
11. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bert Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 230 A2d 498,
500 (NJ. 1967), rev'g218 A.2d 892 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-941
(1997). See generally J. Michael Gottschalk, Comment, The Negligent Nolary Publfc-Emplo)e:
Is His Employer Liable?, 48 NEB. L. REV. 503 (1969) (representing an early analysis ofnotary-
related employer liability).
12. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 462 P.2d 814,817-18 (Ariz Ct.
App. 1969); FLA. STAT. ch. 117.05 (7) (1997).
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agency law may leave injured third parties with an inadequate
recovery, 13 and allow notary employers to escape liability while
benefiting from having notary services available to customers. The
ultimate result is a deterioration in the quality of notary services.
A better approach would rely on agency principles to address work-
related notary misconduct. There is little question that employers not
only have the power to control the scope of the notary services they offer
but also derive some benefit from having notaries on staff. The
existence of employer control and commercial advantage cannot be
minimized or overlooked when resolving the vicarious liability issue.
Unfortunately, cases that have been reluctant to impose vicarious
liability not only tend to ignore, or at least minimize, employer control
and benefit, but often reject vicarious liability with unclear and
unpersuasive reasoning. Further, the significant amount of statutory
protection afforded employers codifies the negative common-law trends
to the ultimate detriment of the public. Although competing interests
unquestionably exist, the balance should be tipped in favor of imposing
vicarious liability on notary employers through the application of agency
principles. 4 To deal with this liability, employers can rely on workplace
education and can insure themselves against notary misconduct.
This Article will begin by providing an overview of the notary office
and liability for notary misconduct. Pertinent provisions of the law of
agency will then be summarized, followed by a discussion of case law
and current statutory provisions dealing with employer liability for
notary employee misconduct. After a critical analysis of existing law,
this Article will suggest common-law and statutory alternatives to
determine employer liability. Finally, suggestions will be made to
alleviate the burden this liability may place on employers, including
ideas for workplace procedures to ensure that instances of notary
employee misconduct are eliminated or kept to a minimum.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Notary Law 5
Notaries have been defined as public officers who administer oaths,
take acknowledgments, and perform other official acts. 6 They have also
13. This is so because the defendant notary may not carry professional insurance, and
because the amount of surety bonds, where required, is typically very low. See Infra note 32.
14. See Gottschalk, supra note 11, at 516-17, 22-23 (stating that the ministerial nature of
notary work opens the door for the application of tort and employer liability).
15. This Article does not seek to provide an exhaustive discussion of notary law, but rather
to set forth a cursory overview of applicable principles. For a valuable reference article, see Michael
L. Closen and G. Grant Dixon III, Notaries Public from the Time of the Roman Empire to the
United States Today, and Tomorrow, 68 N.D. L. REV. 873 (1992). See also 66 C.J.S. Notaries
(1950).
16. See 66 C.J.S. Notaries §§ 1, 6 (1950).
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been described as quasi-judicial officers controlled by the legislative and
executive branches of government. 7 The office of notary public is an
ancient one, having arisen in early Roman times.'8 In the United States,
however, it was the development of trade that created a need for
notaries.' 9 Specifically, persons involved in commerce needed a way to
gauge the reliability and authenticity of commercial documents. A
notary's seal on a document served to authenticate it so it could be relied
upon in foreign jurisdictions and in commercial transactions. 0 The
public's reliance on notarized documents remains an important
underpinning of notary law today.
Notaries hold a public office,2' and the extent of their powers is
dictated by statutory provisions.' The common-law functions of
notaries were traditionally limited to "law merchant," or commercial
activities, such as noting and extending marine protests and presenting
and protesting foreign bills of exchange.' Broader powers authorized
by statute include the authority to administer oaths; take
acknowledgments; and perform judicial functions, such as issuing arrest
warrants, punishing contempt, and performing marriage ceremonies.
24
Regardless of the specific function, notary powers are usually described
as ministerial.'
Perhaps the most common notary functions include the taking of
acknowledgments and the administration of oaths. An example of the
former occurs when a notary notarizes a document such as a will; an
example of the latter occurs when a notary completes an affidavit The
common law and statutes dictate that a notary performing these tasks
must be presented with sufficient evidence that the person whose
acknowledgment is to be taken or to whom an oath is to be administered
is in fact the person whose name appears in the document.2 Once the
signature is executed, the notary witnesses the signature utilizing a stamp
or seal as required by the jurisdiction in which the notary is commis-
sioned.28
17. See Closen & Dixon, supra note 15, at 882.
18. See id. at 874-75.
19. See id. at 876.
20. See id.
21. See George v. General Fin. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 33,35 (E.D. La. 1976).
22. See Kump v. Gee, 187 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Notary cligibility
requirements can arise under constitutional or statutory provisions. See 66 CJ.S. Notaries § 2
(1950).
23. See 66 CJ.S. Notaries §§ 2,6 (1950).
24. See generally Closen & Dixon, supra note 15, at 882-85 (discussing authority ofnotaries
in various states).
25. See Wright v. Bedford, 182 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (Sup. Ct. 1958); ,see also Gottschalk,
supra note 11, at 517.
26. See Closen & Dixon, supra note 15, at 882-84.
27. See, e.g., City Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Metcalf, 775 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ariz. 1989). If,
however, the person who requests the notarial act is personally known to the notary, no such
evidence needs to be shown. See idf; see also FLA. STAT. ch. 117.05 (1996).
28. See In re Estate of Martinez, 664 P.2d 1007 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
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Just as notary powers vary, so do the qualifications of office, but
typically notaries must have the ability to read and write English and
must be at least eighteen years of age.29 Notary candidates normally
apply to the executive branch of the state for a commission," and if the
application is accepted the candidate will be commissioned to serve as
a notary for a fixed term subject to renewal." Notaries also are required
to take an oath of office and may be required to provide a bond to assure
the proper discharge of their notarial duties.32
The importance of the notary function stems from the reliance placed
on notarial acts by others. The appearance of a notary's seal33 on a
document leads others to rely on the authenticity of the item that is
notarized.34 As such, if a notary commits malfeasance in the course of
performing a notary service, tort liability may result.35 In this regard, a
notary is held to an objective standard of care, requiring the notary to act
as a reasonably prudent notary would act in the same community.36 If
this standard of care is violated, the notary will be personally liable for
all harm that is proximately caused by the negligence.3 7 A notary's
surety also will be liable if the notary breaches the conditions of the
bond.38
This selective summary of notary law principles leads to a number of
observations. Notaries are public officers whose primary duty is to help
facilitate commerce by authenticating documents upon which others are
likely to rely. As such, notaries hold a position of public trust. Notaries
are bonded subject to the condition that they faithfully execute their
functions;39 if they breach this duty, the sureties on the bonds are liable
to the individuals who suffer harm as a result of the notaries'
29. See Closen & Dixon, supra note 15, at 878-79.
30. This is normally done through the office of the Secretary of State. See id. at 878.
31. Seeidat887-88.
32. See 66 C.J.S. Notaries § 3 (1950). Bonding amounts among the states are very low.
California is the only state with a bond as high as $15,000, the result of legislation that became
effective in 1997. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8212 (West Supp. 1997); see generally CHARLES N.
FAERBER, NOTARY SEAL & CERTIFICATE VERIFICATION MANUAL (1996-97 ed.). For example,
Idaho requires a $10,000 bond; South Dakota requires a $500 bond; and South Carolina and Rhode
Island are among those states which require no bond at all. See id at 104, 296, 300, 306. Faerber's
text is an extremely useful compilation of requirements for notaries throughout the United States.
33. A seal may or may not be required by statute. For example, a seal is optional in
Connecticut and mandatory in Maryland. See FAERBER, supra note 32, at 47, 155. Ifrequired, a
"seal is prima facie evidence of authority of the notary public to administer the oath and of the
regularity of the certification." Brooks v. State, 11 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940).
34. See, e.g., Barber v. International Co. of Mexico, 48 A. 758, 764 (Conn. 1901).
35. See Closen & Dixon, supra note 15, at 888.
36. See Naquin v. Robert, 559 So. 2d 18, 20 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
37. See Jordan v. O'Connor, 222 P.2d 322,328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
38. See Hemet Home Builders Ass'n v. Wells, 39 P.2d 233, 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934); 66
C.J.S. Notaries § 12 (1950).
39. See Stemmons v. Akins, 283 P.2d 797, 798-99 (Okla. 1955).
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misconduct." For example, if a private notary4 fails to verify the
identification of an individual when taking an acknowledgment, and if
a third party who has relied on that acknowledgment suffers harm that
is proximately caused by the notary's misconduct, the notary and the
notary's surety are liable to the third party. This liability is imposed
under the common law as well as under many state statutes.4 The
Model Notary Act similarly provides that "[a] notary is liable to any
person for all damages proximately caused that person by the notary's
official misconduct in performing a notarization.' 4
The foregoing analysis of private notary liability turns on traditional
tort principles that are quite straightforward. The principles suggest that
a notary and surety would be liable if a third party suffers harm as a
result of a notary employee's misconduct committed while at work."
Because the resources of an individual notary may be limited, however,
and because the bonding amounts in many jurisdictions fail to provide
adequate recovery for most injured parties, the notary's employer would
likely be joined in such a suit under the theory of vicarious liability.
B. Overview of Vicarious Liability
The law of agency, as compiled in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, imposes liability on "masters" for the job-related torts of their
"servants." The master-servant terminology of the Restatement
encompasses employers and employees; thus, the Restatement provisions
arguably apply to employers and their notary staff4
A number of the Restatement's sections are pertinent to this
discussion. Section 219 sets forth the fundamental principle of vicarious
liability: "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.'" 6 Under the
Restatement, an individual is a servant if subject to the control of the
master; if not subject to the master's control, the individual will be
deemed an independent contractor, and the employer will not be liable
40. See Hemet Home Builders Ass'n v. Wells, 39 P.2d at 240.
41. For the purposes of this Article, "private notary" refers to a notary who performs notary
services independent of any other employment situation. This is to be contrasted with the term
"notary employee," which refers to a notary who performs notary services as part of, or incidental
to, another job function.
42. See, e.g., CAL GOV'T CODE § 8214 (Deering 1996).
43. MODELNoTARYAcr § 6-101(a) (1994). Subsection (b) provides that a notary's surety
is likewise liable in an amount not to exceed the penalty of the bond. See Id. § 6-101(b). The
Model Notary Act, published by the National Notary Association in 1984, revises the 1973 Uniform
Notary Act and seeks to provide model legislation for those state legislatures considering the
enactment of notary laws. See i&J § 1-102.
44. Neither the statutes cited above nor the Model Notary Act exempt notary employees from
personal liability for misconduct.
45. See supra note 3.
46. RESTATEIENT, supra note 1, § 219.
1998]
MAINE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 50:23
for the contractor's torts.4 7 Consideration is not necessary to create a
master-servant relationship; even if a person serves another gratuitously,
that person can be a servant if the other accepts the services."
The Restatement lists ten factors for a fact finder to consider in
determining whether the physical conduct of a person is subject to
another's control. The factors focus on the type of activity a person
undertakes for an employer, the type of work-related tools and supplies
the employer provides to the employee, and the intent of the parties.49
A master-servant relationship cannot be defined with precision, and can
arise where the right to control is attenuated.5"
The Restatement makes clear that it is possible for a person to serve
two masters at once. Section 226 provides that "[a] person may be the
servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if
the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service of the
other."' Both masters may thus be responsible for an act by the servant
as long as the act is in the scope of employment for both masters.5 2
Nevertheless, if the servant's intent to serve one master "necessarily
47. See id. §§ 2, 220(1). Section 2 makes clear that a servant is to be contrasted with an
independent contractor, who contracts with a person to do the work for that person, but whose
physical conduct is not subject to that person's control. See id. § 2(3). The general rule states that
the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for third.party harm resulting from the
independent contractor's negligence. See Hammond v. Bechtel, Inc., 606 P.2d 1269, 1273-74
(Alaska 1980); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 220 cmt. e.
48. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 225 & cmt. a.
49. Subsection (2) of Restatement § 220 (Definition of Servant) provides:
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant, and
G) whether the principal is or is not in business.
50. See id cmts. c, d.
51. Id § 226. The test under this principle is whether one person or another "had the right
to control, not only the work to be done, but also the manner of doing it." Dickerson v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 211 F.2d 200,202 (3d Cir. 1953) (applying Pennsylvania law). There is no
surrender of control merely because an employer permits control to be divided. See Id at 203.
52. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 226 cmt. a.
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excludes an intent to serve the other," the servant will not be deemed to
be serving two masters simultaneously.53
Not only must a master-servant relationship exist, but an employee
must also act within the scope of employment for an employer to be
liable for the employee's torts.' The Restatement sets forth a three-part
test which must be met for a tortfeasor to be considered to be acting
within the scope of employment.55 First, the conduct must be the type
the person is employed to perform.56 Second, the conduct must occur
substantially within authorized time and space limits.57 Third, the
conduct must be actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master.58 Conduct is not considered to be within the scope of
employment if it fails to meet any part of the test.59
Comments to section 228 emphasize that the master determines what
lies within the scope of employment, but that in any event there must be
some purpose to serve the master for the scope of employment test to be
met.60 The mere fact that an individual is employed is not enough;
rather, the employee's conduct must work toward accomplishing an
authorized purpose and must be done at an authorized place and time.
If this is so, an inference arises that the conduct occurs within the scope
of employment.6" The comments further reiterate that the employer must
be able to control the servant in order for the employer to be liable.62
Conduct by an employee that leads to employer liability must be "of
the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct
authorized." 3 This language makes clear that some incidental acts will
lead to employer liability. If the act is subordinate to or pertinent to an
act that is part of the job description, it could lead to liability.'
Comments to section 229 additionally state that the "ultimate question
is whether or not it is just that the loss resulting from the servant's acts
should be considered as one of the normal risks to be borne by the
business in which the servant is employed." '6
Faced with the prospect of liability, employers might simply forbid
employees from performing tasks in a negligent manner. But
Restatement section 230 provides that an act may be committed within
the scope of employment even if an employer forbids the servant to
53. Id
54. See id § 228(1).
55. See id
56. See id
57. See id
58. See id
59. See id § 228(2).
60. See d § 228 cmt a.
61. See idcmt. b.
62. See id cmt. c.
63. Id § 229(1).
64. See id cmt b.
65. Id cmt a.
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commit the act.66 Comments to this section state that an employer
cannot expect an employee to perform only in the manner in which he
or she has been instructed.67 Nevertheless, if an employer bans an
employee from performing a certain type of act, it may indicate that such
acts, if committed, would not be committed within the scope of
employment.68
These black-letter principles, while certainly subject to interpretation
by case law as well as modification by statute, provide valuable guidance
when considering whether the employer of a notary employee should be
liable for work-related notary misconduct. If an employer purposely
hires an individual to serve in a capacity in which notary services will be
performed periodically, standard agency principles arguably apply.
Although the notary position might be considered a "distinct
occupation,"69 the details of which an employer does not control, the
work is often performed at the employer's direction, at the employer's
place of business, and as part of the notary's salaried job. Further, the
employer is likely to pay for the notary's commission and supplies. As
such, a reasonable argument can be made that the employee's notary
activities are sufficiently controlled by the employer for the employee to
be deemed a servant.7" Additionally, there would seem to be little
question that an employer's decision to hire a notary is based, in part, on
a belief that its business will benefit by having the notary on staff.
Under this scenario the employee's performance of notary work would
be the type of conduct the employee was hired to perform, would occur
within authorized time and space limits, and would at least partially be
actuated by a purpose to serve the employer. The employee, then, would
fit the definition of servant and would, as notary, act within the scope of
employment.7
If such an employee committed notary misconduct, employer liability
would result even if the notary services were seen as only incidental to
the employee's main job function.' Additionally, it would make no
difference if the employer instructed the notary to perform all notary
services in strict accordance with the law. 3 Nor would the result change
if the employer did not pay for notary fees and supplies, since the
gratuitous rendering of notary services for the employer's benefit will
not defeat vicarious liability.74 Finally, the fact that the notary employee
was acting at least in part on behalf of the state at the time of the
66. See id § 230 ("An act, although forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner, may be
within the scope of employment.").
67. See id cmt. b.
68. See id cmt. c.
69. See id § 220(2)(6).
70. See supra note 49.
71. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 228.
72. See id § 229(1).
73. See id § 230.
74. See id § 225.
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misconduct will not free the employer from liability, since agency
principles admit to the possibility that an individual can serve two
masters at the same time. 5 Only if a court is convinced that the
performance of notary services "necessarily" requires the abandonment
of an intent to serve the employer would this last argument fail.76
Courts and legislatures could benefit by carefully considering and
applying Restatement principles when determining whether vicarious
liability should be imposed on notary employers. As the discussion
below demonstrates, however, this is not often done.
III. CASE LAW
Numerous cases explore the issue of employer liability for notary
employee misconduct, a number of which date from the nineteenth
century. Many cases resolve the issue by asking whether notaries can
act in their professional capacity while at the same time acting as their
employers' agents. More recent cases wrestle with the same question
and also focus on reliance and proximate cause.
A. Early Cases
Many early cases deal with damages resulting from negligent notary
practices in conjunction with note protests." The cases are split on the
issue of vicarious liability, revealing an early struggle with the status of
notaries as public officers.78
In the 1880 case of Davey v. Jones," the New Jersey Supreme Court
determined that a bank could be liable for the negligence of its notary
agent where the notary misread the name of a note's endorser and failed
to send notice of insufficient funds to the note holder."0 The court held
that the collecting bank had a duty to do all that was needed to protect
the note holder's rights." The bank knew the holder and had a duty to
inform the notary, "who was its agent," of the correct name.at Because
the notary was the bank's agent, he was charged with the bank's
75. See id § 226.
76. See id
77. A "protest" involves a demand for payment of a note "in proper form, and at a proper
time; and in case of non-payment, due and reasonable notice to the indorsers by the bank, or any
of its clerks or servants, or other suitable person." Ayrault v. Pacific Bank, 47 N.Y. 570, 575
(1872).
78. The split in authority has been documented in secondary authority. See generally
MECHEM, supra note 2, § 1313 (describing the split of authority in bank collection cases, and
mentioning New York as one ofthose states that would impose liability on a bank which acts as an
independent contractor in the collection of a note vi ere its notary is negligent in presenting the
paper and giving notice).
79. 42 NJ.L. 28 (1880).
80. Seeid at31.
81. Seeidat30.
82. Id.
1998]
MINE LA WREVIEW
knowledge as to the identity of the holder, and the notary's failure to
properly notify the holder "must be treated as the negligence of the
bank.,1 3 The court held that "[a] bank which assumes the duty of a
collecting agent, is absolutely liable for any negligence or default of a
notary ... in relation to it." 4
Although Davey v. Jones held the bank liable for its notary's
negligence, certain facts of that case should be emphasized. The bank
itself was negligent in failing to share its knowledge regarding the
holder's identity with the notary. 5 When the notary was later negligent
in following through with the protest, the court determined the bank
should be liable. 6 Davey is thus not a true vicarious liability case,
where liability would be imposed on the bank for its notary's negligence
even if the bank was not at fault. Rather, it is a case where the bank and
its notary were negligent. Nevertheless, Davey is notable because of its
unambiguous language describing the notary as the bank's agent.
Many years after Davey v. Jones, the New Jersey Supreme Court
again held a notary employer liable in Simon v. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co. 7 In Simon, a notary who was also a teller at a bank negligently
protested a note.88 The court held the bank liable, stating that a bank
receiving a note for collection undertakes "to do everything that may be
necessary to make the collection, and... assume[s] a full liability for
any negligence of which its correspondent may be guilty."89 Although
the scope of the collecting bank's duty was limited on appeal," Simon
demonstrates the court's willingness to impose liability on a bank for its
notary's negligence. Thus, Simon is more of a vicarious liability case
than Davey, since under Simon the bank would be liable even if the
negligence of the bank's notary-cashier was the sole cause of the
plaintiff's harm.
Other courts similarly determined that notaries employed by banks to
protest notes fulfill duties the banks otherwise would have to carry out
themselves, and as such the banks could be liable for the negligence of
their notaries under agency theory. In Ayrault v. Pacific Bank,9 a bank
routinely delivered notes to a notary public for protest. The notary
negligently completed a protest and a lawsuit ensued.' Relying on
various authorities, the bank argued that it was not liable because the
83. Id.
84. Id at3l.
85. See id at 30.
86. See id at31.
87. 180 A. 682 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1935), revd on other grounds, 184 A. 793 (N.J. 1936).
88. See id. at 684-85.
89. d at 683 (quoting Annotation, General Discussion of the Nature of the Relationship
of Employer and Independent Contractor, 19 A.L.R. 226, 264 (1922)).
90. See Simon v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 184 A. 793, 794 (N.J. 1936). There the court
held that a collecting bank has a duty only to give notice of the note's dishonor to the note holder
or the parties involved.
91. 47 N.Y. 570 (1872).
92. See id at571.
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notary was not its agent.' The plaintiff responded that the bank did "not
fulfill its duty [merely] by putting the paper into the hands of a notary,
but the bank is answerable for the conduct of its agents in the
premises."' The court agreed, holding that if a bank employs a notary
to present notes for payment, and if there is no contract limiting the
bank's liability or stating that the bank's sole function is to hand over the
notes to a competent notary, the notary will be deemed to be the agent
of the bank and the bank will be liable for the notary's negligence.95
Evidence to the effect that it was the custom of the banking industry to
hand over notes to notaries did not change the nature of the contract
between banks and their customers.'
In other jurisdictions courts responded differently. In 1891, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that a bank was not liable for negligence
committed by a notary in the course of protesting a note.' In May v.
Jones, suit was brought against a notary and his bank employer when the
notary neglected to present a note to the proper bank.' Although the
court held that there was clearly an action against the notary," it rejected
the notion that the bank should be liable as well:
mTlhe notary is not a mere agent or servant of the bank, but is a public
officer, sworn to discharge his duties properly. He is under a higher
control than that of a private principal. He owes duties to the public
which must be the supreme law of his conduct. Consequently when
he acts in his official capacity, the bank no longer has control over
him and cannot direct how his duties shall be done."
The court saw a "sharp dividing line" between the functions of the bank
and those of the notary as a public officer, and further noted that the
bank could not control the notary in the performance of his public
function.' O'
The public officer rationale of May v. Jones contrasts sharply with the
analysis in cases such as Ayrault. In May, the court refused to hold the
bank vicariously liable for the notary's negligence despite the bank's
employment of the notary and the notary's negligent performance of the
duty for which he was employed. The court's rationale can easily be
tied into the Restatement's definition of servant: In the court's view
only the state, not the bank, controlled the actions of the notary in
performing the protest; as such, the notary was not a servant of the bank
when performing that function and therefore there was no agency
93. See i' at 572.
94. Id
95. See id at 574.
96. See iaJ
97. See May v. Jones, 14 S.E. 552, 553 (Ga. 1891).
98. See id
99. See id
100. Id
101. Id at554.
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relationship.' °2 This would appear so even though the notary was
performing a function that he was authorized to do, performed it within
authorized time and space limits, and in doing so furthered a purpose of
the bank. Put another way, it appears that even though the notary might
have met the test for acting within the scope of employment 3 he failed
to meet the threshold test of being the bank's servant at the time the
negligence occurred.
Other early cases, however, questioned the notion that notaries act
exclusively for the state when performing notary services. In Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Andres,1"4 a notary who
also worked as a real estate agent defrauded an individual of a piece of
property.'0 5 Suit was brought against the notary's surety, who claimed
the fraud occurred while the notary was working as a real estate agent
and not while acting as notary. 0 6 The court held that the notary's
fraudulent acts were within the terms of the notary's official bond
despite the fact that the notary was acting as a real estate agent at the
same time:
The fact that the fraud of the notary in his capacity as real estate agent
operated concurrently with his official act did not defeat the liability
on the official bond. The very act of the notary public in his official
capacity was an essential factor in divesting the title to the land, and
it enabled the real estate agents to consummate the fraud."°
A similar argument was made in Lacour v. National Surety Co.,08
where a notary employee forged a series of notes and checks and then
absconded with the funds."° When suit was brought against the notary's
surety, the surety company argued that the notary forged the documents
and embezzled the proceeds while an agent of the employer and not as
a notary."0 The court held that the notary's regular employment did not
divest the notary of his official character."' Important to the court was
the fact that the fraud could not have been committed unless the
employee had been a notary." 2
Aetna and Lacour are cases that were brought against surety
companies to recover on notary bonds, rather than cases brought against
notary employers. The holdings of these cases on the question of the
102. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
104. 25 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1930).
105. See it at 52.
106. See id
107. Id at53.
108. 85 So. 600 (La. 1920).
109. See id at600-01.
110. Seeid at601.
111. See id at 602. The court was mindful of the fact that, had it ruled otherwise, sureties
would escape liability in nearly all cases. See id Further, a Louisiana statute provided that notary
employers were protected by notary sureties. See id
112. Seeid at601.
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nature of the notary's actions at the time of the misconduct is, however,
relevant to this discussion. Both courts held that the notaries could act
as notaries and employees simultaneously, seemingly rejecting the idea
presented in May v. Jones that notary employees, when performing
notarial acts, act solely for the state. Restatement section 226 similarly
recognizes that an employee can simultaneously serve two employers."'
B. Recent Cases
More recent cases continue to reveal divergent views on the issue of
employer liability for notary employee misconduct. In the absence of
statutory guidance, one judicial approach eschews reliance on agency
theory while another embraces vicarious liability.
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Burt Thomas-Aitken
Construction Co., 4 the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the
application of agency principles in a case where a notary, who was an
assistant cashier at a bank, negligently notarized signatures on an
indemnity agreement."1 5 The agreement was purportedly signed by the
principals of a construction company, and although the agreement was
not part of a bank transaction, the construction company was a bank
customer. 6 One of the principals' signatures was allegedly forged, and
the bonding company, on whose behalf the indemnity agreement was
prepared, sustained a loss after the construction company defaulted on
ajob.117 The bonding company sued the bank, claiming the notary was
the bank's agent.'
The trial court held that the bank was not liable as a matter of law.1 9
Even though a bank might be liable if a notary employee performs a duty
for the bank and in the bank's interest, here the act was that of a public
official. 2 ' Since the notarial act was a mere accommodation for bank
customers, it was only incidentally performed in the bank's interest.
Key to the trial court's decision was the fact that the notary misconduct
occurred in relation to a non-bank transaction. The ready availability of
the notary to bank customers did not overshadow the fact that the notary
was acting in his public capacity: "The bank has no control in such
event of the method of taking the acknowledgment."'" The trial court,
however, left the door open for employer liability in cases where a
113. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 226; supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
114. 230 A.2d 498 (NJ. 1967), rev'g Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burr Thomas-Aitken
Constr. Co., 218 A.2d 892 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
115. Seeidat500-01.
116. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bert Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 209 A.2d 155, 156
(NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965).
117. See id at 156.
118. See id
119. See id at 158.
120. See id
121. See id at 157.
122. Id at 157-58.
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notary's act involves bank business. Cast in Restatement terms, the
court seemed to say that, due to the lack of employer control, the
notary's act was not that of a servant and that, in any event, the act was
not committed in the scope of employment because it was too incidental
to the bank's interest.
The intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the mere fact
that the indemnity agreement was not a bank transaction was not
dispositive of the matter." The court reasoned that the scope of
employment test was the crucial focus and, based on the notary's
deposition, the trier of fact could find that the notary acted "with the
authority and approval of the bank and thus within the scope of his
employment."' 24 The court determined that accommodating customers
with notary services was likely a part of bank business, and that if the
services were actuated in part by a purpose to improve customer
relations the scope of employment test was satisfied.'25 Summary
judgment for the defendant was therefore improper.'26
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, 7 taking issue with the
appellate court's easy resort to standard agency principles. The court
held the notary was a public officer and "as such exercises an authority
the bank itself could not receive and does an act the bank itself could not
do."'2 Further, the court reasoned that the plaintiff did not rely on a link
between the notary and the bank and that an acknowledgment by any
notary would have met the plaintiff's requirements. 2 9
In the court's view, a notary's powers come from the state, not from
an employer, and earlier bank protest cases holding banks liable for
notary negligence involved situations where banks hired notaries to
perform the banks' own work. 3 ' In this case, however, the bank could
not perform the notary service and was not a party to the transaction.
The mere fact that the bank offered notary services to customers was not
enough to alter the result.' The court reasoned that someone who seeks
out a notary looks only to the notary and not the notary's employer. 112
In short, "any notary will do."'3
The court ultimately resolved the issue by making a policy decision.
Mindful of the fact that lawyers make extensive use of notary services
123. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burt Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 218 A.2d 892, 893
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
124. Id. at 893-94.
125. See id. at 894.
126. See id.
127. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burt Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 230 A.2d 498 (N.J.
1967).
128. Id. at 499.
129. See id The plaintiff had, in fact, claimed that it did not know the notary was employed
by a bank. See id. at 500.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
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and that the imposition of vicarious liability would greatly impact the
legal profession, the court reasoned that it would be unjust to hold the
bank liable." The court's emphasis on the equities of the case reflects
the Restatement's view that the imposition of vicarious liability
ultimately hinges on whether it is just for an employer to bear the loss. 135
To some extent the court also engaged in a balancing analysis, remarking
that public convenience, which is served by notaries who are employed
by others, overshadows the goodwill an employer receives by making
notary services available to its customers.1
36
The court did not close the door on employer liability altogether. The
opinion concludes with an exception to the rule disallowing employer
liability: An employer might be liable if it somehow participates in the
notary misconduct by asking or encouraging the notary to act
negligently, or if the employer leads another to believe that the notary
acted on its behalf and under its authority.'37
Justice Francis's dissent points out that the notary acted "primarily to
serve the bank's interest, not his own," and that he had performed
notarial acts for years with the bank's understanding that it was a service
to its customers.' Further, there was little question that the bank knew
the notary certificates completed by its employee would be relied upon
in commerce by persons such as the plaintiff.39 As such, ajury could
find that the notary's act was in the bank's interest. 4 '
Under the majority's view, the bank's liability would require the bank
to be a party to the transaction in which the notary misconduct occurred.
The court suggests that a notary is only subject to an employer's control
for vicarious liability purposes if the notary services are provided to
customers for employer-related transactions. Unless these facts are
present, there is no master-servant relationship. The court's analysis
also suggests the related view that a notary does not act within the scope
of employment if notary services are performed as part of a non-bank
transaction.
Although the Commercial Union court would impose liability on an
employer if it coerced a notary employee to commit notary misconduct,
those facts would raise an issue of the employer's own culpability. In
such a case the employer's liability would be premised on its own fault,
rather than on its vicarious liability for the fault of an employee.' 4 1
134. See id at501.
135. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 228 cmL a; see also supra text accompanying note
65.
136. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burt Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 230 A.2d at 501.
137. See id
138. la at 502 (Francis, ., dissenting).
139. See id at 502-03.
140. See id at 503.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9. On remand, the bank notary was vindicated.
The jury found that he did not know the acknoWledgment was false and therefore was not negligent.
See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burt Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 253 A.2d 469,471 (NJ. 1969).
Once again Justice Francis, in dissent, took the opportunity to state that whenever a notay
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In 1969, the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
vicarious liability in a notary employment context. In Transamerica
Insurance Co. v. Valley National Bank;' a title insurance company
brought suit against a notary and the notary's bank employer. The bank
had insisted that its manager's secretary get a notary commission and
agreed to pay all of her notary fees. There was evidence that the
notary's superiors often asked her to notarize signatures outside the
presence of the signing parties."' In the facts giving rise to the case, the
secretary took the acknowledgment of a bank customer who did not
appear before her. The notary was acquainted with the person who
purportedly signed the document, but was told by the person who
brought her the document that the signer could not be present because
he was too busy.'" The document was a warranty deed under which the
signer was the grantor. The signature was forged and the title company,
relying on the notarized signature, disbursed funds.'45 Based on the
public official status of notaries, the trial court granted the bank's
motion for summary judgment; in its view the notary's act did not
further bank business and the bank had not participated in the
misconduct. 6
On appeal, the court ruled that notaries are not public officials "in the
ordinary sense" even though the state constitution and statutes make
clear that they are public officers.' Accordingly, the court concluded
that notaries are "quasi-public" officers only, and that this status should
not be used to shield employers from liability.'
The court cited with approval those cases imposing liability on banks
where notaries were negligent in performing bank obligations.'49 In its
opinion agency principles should apply, making the crucial inquiry
whether the employee was acting in the scope of employment when the
negligence occurred. 5 ° The court believed the first part of the
Restatement test was adequately demonstrated because the bank had
asked the secretary to become a notary, supplied her with all she needed
to perform the notary work, and paid for the commission. As such,
reasonable jurors could differ as to whether the notary services were
accommodates a customer he acts in the course of employment, since his act benefits the bank. See
id. at 472 (Francis, J., dissenting). Further, in his view the bank was aware that the notary's
certificate would be relied upon in the business world. See ld at 473.
142. 462 P.2d 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
143. See id at815.
144. See id
145. See id at815.
146. See id at816.
147. The court cited to the earlier case of Harris v. Watson, 161 S.E. 215, 220 (N.C. 1931)
(Brogden, J., dissenting), in which it was noted that if notaries are judicial officers, the state has an
enormous judicial branch. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 462 P.2d at 816-17.
148. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 462 P.2d at 817-18.
149. See id at 817.
150. See id at 818. Interestingly, the court never analyzed the work arrangement between the
bank and its notary to determine whether a master-servant relationship existed.
[Vol. 50:23
NOTARY EMPLOYEES
included in herjob-related duties.'5 ' There was also sufficient evidence
regarding the second part of the scope of employment test since the
misconduct took place within authorized time and space limits. 52 As to
the third part of the test, requiring that the notary's act be done at least
in part to serve a purpose of the bank, the court found the facts were at
least debatable.'53 Accordingly, the bank's motion for summary
judgment should have been denied.'54
Although the court could have concluded with this analysis, it further
stated that the case fell within the Commercial Union exception, under
which a notary employer might be liable if it coerces a notary employee
to commit misconduct.'55 Because there was evidence suggesting that
the bank encouraged the notary to take acknowledgments outside of the
presence of the acknowledging parties, liability under the Commercial
Union exception was also likely.
The Transamerica court was more accepting of the notion that today's
notaries are often employed to perform professional services for the
benefit of their employers. Certainly this appears true from the court's
description of notaries as "quasi-public" officers and its willing
application of agency principles. It is interesting that the court nowhere
questioned whether the plaintiff relied on the bank in any way,
indicating that reliance on the employer was a non-issue. Although the
court mentioned the employer's encouragement of illegal notary
practice, it did so only to place the case within the Commercial Union
exception, suggesting that even in the absence of those facts the court
would have determined that a vicarious liability case could proceed.
California courts have also applied agency principles to notary
employee cases, albeit with little discussion. In Iselin-Jefferson
Financial Co. v. United California Bank; " a notary negligently took the
acknowledgment of a forged signature on a loan guarantee agreement.157
The plaintiff purchased accounts receivable from a company on
condition that the company furnish written guarantees from one of the
company's debtors.' The guarantees were to be completed by two of
the debtor company's principals and their wives.' In the wives'
absence, the principals presented the guarantee document to an officer
of the defendant bank and asked for the signatures to be notarized."6 A
bank notary did so after the officer told him that one of the wives had
signed the guarantee and that the officer had compared signatures from
151. See id
152. See id
153. See id
154. See id
155. See id at818-19.
156. 549 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1976).
157. See id at143.
158. See id
159. See id
160. See id at 143.
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bank files.' The wife had actually refused to sign the guarantee and her
signature had been forged.' When the debtor company later defaulted,
the plaintiff sued on the guarantees and also sued the notary, the notary's
surety, and the bank.'63 After the guarantors defaulted, the remaining
parties stipulated to the notary's misconduct and to the fact that the
notary had acted for the bank in the scope of employment.'" The trial
court ruled that the plaintiff relied on the guarantee and notary certificate
and would not have agreed to the transaction without them.'65
Accordingly, the trial court imposed judgment against the notary, the
surety, and the bank.'"
A later California case cites Iselin-Jefferson and accepts the principle
of employer liability for notary employee negligence without much
explanation. In Garton v. Title Insurance and Trust Co., 67 a notary
employed by a title insurer took a false acknowledgment on a deed of
trust. 68 The deed omitted mineral and gas rights that were to have been
reserved by the grantors.169 The plaintiff-buyers did not appear before
the notary when the deed of trust was notarized, and the notary later
attached an exception to the deed setting forth the mineral and gas
reservation. 70 The reservation prevented the plaintiffs from using the
property as they had planned, and they sued the notary and the title
insurer for fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.' 7 ' As to liability based
on the improper notarization, the court stated that it was well-settled that
a notary's breach of duty leads to liability if the damages are
proximately caused by the breach. The court also held that, "TI&T,
as [the notary's] employer, may ... be held liable for the improper
taking of the acknowledgment."'
The California cases, due to their lack of discussion, are not very
instructive on the issue of vicarious liability. They nevertheless
demonstrate that California accepts the application of agency principles
to job-related notary misconduct. 74
161. See id
162. See id
163. See id
164. See id
165. See id
166. See id. In Iselin-Jefferson the bank stipulated that the notary misconduct occurred
within the scope of employment, so the court did not address the issue. See id. It is interesting that
the parties did not dispute the existence of an agency relationship based on the rationale of
Commercial Union, which had been decided nine years earlier.
167. 165 Cal. Rptr. 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
168. See id at453.
169. See id
170. See id
171. See id
172. See id at455.
173. Id at456.
174. Courts have stated that the question ofwhether an employee-employer relationship exists
is a question of fact to be determined under state law. See Wemer v. Wemer, 526 P.2d 370,376
(Wash. 1974) (en banc). In Werner, the issue was whether out-of-state notary employers were
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At least one New York court has similarly imposed vicarious liability
in a notary employer case. In Independence Leasing Corp. v. Aquino, 1 5
a young man opened an account at a bank with the assistance of a branch
manager and then asked the manager, who was also a notary, to notarize
a car lease document. 6 The document was signed in front of the notary
by someone who was believed to be the young man's father. The signer
was not the father, and when payments were not made on the lease the
plaintiff leasing company sued the notary, the bank, and the father.'"
The cause of action brought against the notary and bank was based on
a state statute imposing liability on a notary for misconduct in the
performance of his powers.'78 The lower court held that if the father did
not in fact sign the lease document the branch manager and the employer
bank would be liable for the manager's notarization as long as the act
constituted notary misconduct under state law.' 79 On appeal, the court
held that misconduct includes negligence in the performance of notarial
duties."s Further, the court stated that the negligence of the notary and
that of the bank was "amply supported by the record."'' The court held,
however, that proof was needed as to the plaintiff's reliance on the
notary's actions and accordingly ordered a new trial." Much like the
California cases, Independence Leasing does not fully discuss the issue
of vicarious liability but instead accepts its application without
elaboration. Notably, the court was willing to impose employer liability
where the misconduct occurred in a transaction that was not directly
related to the employer's business.
C. Proximate Cause
Employer liability for notary employee misconduct requires the
misconduct to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. The issue
of proximate cause has been examined in cases brought against notary
employers as well as sureties.
One point that is repeatedly made in these cases is that the notary
misconduct need not be the sole cause of the harm for surety or
subject to the state's jurisdiction where the notary employees' misconduct resulted in the plaintiffs
harm. See id The court stated, "[w]hile the notaries are public officers, it may be assumed that
there is a sufficient agency relationship with their emplo)rs to render the employers also subject
to this forum's jurisdiction." I
175. 506 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Erie County Ct. 1986).
176. See id. at 1004.
177. See id n.1.
178. See id at 1004.
179. See Independence Leasing Corp. v. Aquino, 480 N.Y.S.2d 274,275 (Buffalo City CL
1984), affldinpart rev'dinpart4 506 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Erie County CL 1986). The court, hoaver,
concluded that under the state statute negligence was insufficient to show notary misconduct. See
id at 276.
180. See Independence Leasing Corp. v. Aquino, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
181. Id
182. See id
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employer liability to attach. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Andres, 13 suit was brought against a surety for
the misconduct of a notary who also acted as a real estate agent. The
surety claimed that the false notary certificate was not the proximate
cause of the harm."s4 The court stated that the notary's act need not be
the sole cause of the harm: "If it is a concurring cause and plays a part
in bringing about the injury, the liability for the loss is fixed."'85
Because the notary's completion of a false notary certificate, when
coupled with his acts as a real estate agent, led to the loss, proximate
cause was shown. 86 It was irrelevant that the notary's professional
misconduct occurred simultaneously with his fraudulent acts as a real
estate agent.'87
Similarly, in Commonwealth ex rel. Smolovitz v. American Surety
Co., 8 the court had to deal with a suit brought against the surety on a
notary's bond."8 9 A notary completed a certificate for the release of a
mechanic's lien without one of the signing parties appearing before
her. 9 The absent signer, who was the president of the construction
company that built the plaintiff's home, had signed the lien releases but
never signed the affidavit.19' Nevertheless, the notary certified that he
was present when she notarized the document."9 A number of liens
were later filed against the plaintiffs' property and the plaintiffs sued the
notary's surety.93 Despite the fact that there was no law requiring the
lien releases to be notarized, the plaintiffs argued that they relied on "the
affidavit as to the authenticity of the release of liens."' 94 The court
found that the transaction would never have been completed unless there
was a sworn lien release. It further reiterated that a notary's misconduct
must be a proximate cause of the harm, although it need not be the sole
cause. 1
95
Although Smolovitz does not furnish a test for proximate cause, other
surety cases do. In State ex rel. Nelson v. Hammett,"9 the court held that
in order for proximate cause to be met "the acts causing the loss must
have followed each other in natural, continuous, and unbroken
183. 25 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1930).
184. See id. at 52.
185. Id
186. See id
187. See id at53.
188. 149 A.2d 515 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959).
189. Seeid at516.
190. See id
191. See id
192. See id
193. See id
194. See id
195. See id at 517. Finding the jury's decision against the plaintiffs to be unwarranted in the
face of the evidence on proximate cause, the court set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial. See
id.
196. 203 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. CL App. 1947).
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sequence."' 97 Other cases emphasize that the plaintiff need not be a
party to the document in order to recover against a surety. As long as
damages are proximately caused by the notary's misconduct, there may
be recovery.'98
A recent Florida case, Ameriseal, Inc. v. Leiffer, ' also deals with
proximate cause. There, a notary employee of a law firm was
approached by a co-worker's husband, who asked her to notarize two
signatures.00 The documents reflected that the two individuals whose
signatures appeared were agents of an insurance company.20' The
employee notarized the signatures even though neither individual was
personally known to her and neither appeared before her to swear to the
truth of the information in the papers.0 2 Ameriseal paid premiums
totaling $70,000 to secure bonds that were represented by the falsely
notarized papers.203 The insurance company denied having issued the
bonds and Ameriseal lost a state road painting contract as a result.204
Ameriseal sued the husband, the notary, and the law firm employer.2 5
The trial court entered summary judgment for the law firm and the
notary, accepting their argument that the notary's act was not the
proximate cause of the harnm. 2°' This ruling was reversed on appeal, the
court finding that there was an issue of fact as to whether Ameriseal's
harm stemmed from its reliance on the invalid notarization. The court
197. Id at 120.
198. See, e.g., Brittain v. Monsur, 195 S.W. 911,917 (rex. Ct. App. 1917). Brittain similarly
emphasizes facts demonstrating the plaintiffs reliance on a fraudulent certificate of
acknowledgment. See id at 912-13.
199. 673 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
200. See id at 71.
201. See id at 69.
202. See id
203. See id
204. See ia
205. See id Ameriseal also filed a claim against the notary's surety. See Id at 71 (Sharp. J.,
dissenting). Florida requires a bond in the amount of S5,000.00 to be paid to any person harmed
as a result of the notary's misconduct. See Id n. 1.
The case arose under section 117.05(7) of the Florida Statutes, which provides: "The employer
of a notary public shall be liable to the persons involved for all damages proximately caused by the
notary's official misconduct, if the notary public was acting within the scope of his or her
employment at the time the notary engaged in the official misconduct." FLA. STAT. ch. 117.05(7)
(1995). The statute imposes liability on an employer as long as the employee acted in the scope of
employment at the time of the misconduct. As such, the statute approaches the issue of liability by
relying on agency doctrine.
Despite the statute's requirement that the notary must be acting in the scope of employment, the
defendants never raised this issue, instead relying on proximate cause. See Amris=l, Inc. v.
Leiffer, 673 So. 2d at 69-70. Because the notary emplo)e assisted the husband of a friend and thus
performed the notarization on a document that was apparently not related to law firm business, an
argument might have been raised that the notary service ws not actuated by any purpose to serve
the employer. If this were so, a crucial part of the scope of employment test would not have been
met, and the law firm might have had another defense.
206. See Ameriseal, Inc. v. Leiffer, 673 So. 2d at 69.
207. See id at 70.
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was persuaded by Ameriseal's affidavit, which stated that the plaintiff
would not have paid the premiums without having relied on the
notarized signatures.2 8
The court found irrelevant the defendants' argument that even if the
two individuals personally appeared before the notary the bonds would
have been invalid because those individuals did not have actual
authority.2 9 The court reasoned that the two "might have been unwilling
to swear falsely, . . . and.., had they signed, they, and not the notary,
would be civilly liable for any loss. ' '21O Defendants also claimed that
Ameriseal had purchased other invalid bonds not involving the notary's
misconduct.21' But the court reasoned that "[t]he misconduct of others
does not immunize [the notary] and her employer from damages
resulting from her misconduct."
12
The dissent argued that the facts were insufficient to show proximate
cause. It cited to Gardner v. Weiler,21 3 in which a notary certified a
seller's fraudulently obtained acknowledgment on a warranty deed. The
Gardner court ruled that the notarization was too far removed from the
seller's damage to constitute proximate cause.214 The court stated:
We do not think that a notary's acknowledgment of the seller's
execution on a warranty deed, which had been fraudulently
constructed by the buyer to effect a transaction different from the one
actually agreed between seller and buyer, is a substantial cause of the
seller's loss. It may have played a role. It may have been the
predicate for recordation. It may be traced in the web of
circumstances from the one to the other. But it is not the proximate
cause of her loss. 2
11
The proximate cause case law illustrates two points. First, in suits
brought against notary sureties or employers based on notary
misconduct, the notary error need not be the sole cause of the plaintiff's
harm. Second, the plaintiff's reliance on the invalid notarization is often
a factor in determining proximate cause. As to the latter point, it makes
no difference if the notarization upon which the plaintiff relied was
required by law; rather, as long as the misconduct plays a part in causing
the injury, liability can result. How substantial a role the notary
misconduct plays in the ultimate harm is likewise important, and this
208. See id
209. See id
210. Id
211. See id.
212. Id
213. 630 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
214. See id. at 670.
215. Id at 670-7 1. A very recent case emphasizes that a notary's act will be the proximate
cause of a plaintiff's harm only when the harm results from a breach of the notary's duty. See
Dickey v. Royal Banks, 111 F.3d 580, 584 (8' Cir. 1997) (suggesting that notary's duty is limited
to assuring the authenticity of the plaintiff's signature).
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normally will be a question for the trier of fact.216
The case law dealing with notary employer liability is not easily
summarized. The opinions are divergent and often are accompanied by
little in the way of rationale. Numerous issues are touched upon, among
them agency, reliance, and proximate cause. As the next section of this
Article demonstrates, statutory approaches exhibit slightly more
consistency.
IV. STATUTES
Faced with a body of common law that is in conflict on the issue of
employer liability for notary employee misconduct, some state
legislatures have enacted statutes governing the issue. The majority of
these statutes impose employer liability if the scope of employment test
is met, but additionally require that the employer either know of or
consent to the notary misconduct. Other statutes focus on instances
where the employer coerces or directs the misconduct. Only one state
adopts a pure agency approach to employer liability.
Before an employer can incur liability for notary employee
misconduct under the Idaho and Virginia statutes, there must be proof
that the notary acted within the scope of employment at the time of the
misconduct and that the employer had "actual knowledge of, or
reasonably should have known of," the notary's misconduct 217 There is
little guidance in the statutes as to the meaning of knowledge, and no
cases have arisen under them. 18
In Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, and West Virginia, employer liability
requires that the notary act within the scope of employment at the time
of the misconduct and that the employer consent to the misconduct 9
Just as "knowledge" is not defined in the Idaho and Virginia statutes,
there is no guidance as to the meaning of "consent" in these three
statutes, and no cases have interpreted them.
The Connecticut, Oregon, and Florida statutes take different
approaches. Connecticut's law imposes employer liability but is silent
on scope of employment.?0  Instead, it requires that the notary
misconduct be related to the employer's business and that the employer
direct, encourage, consent to, ratify or approve of the misconduct either
in the particular transaction or, implicitly, by previous actions in at least
216. See, e.g., Cole v. Austin, 33 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Mich. 1948); Burnett v. Yuzt, 247 S.W.2d
227,228 (Ky. 1952). ButseeJOSE'HW. GLA.ON, TmELAWOFTORTs, 156-57 (1995), mtere the
author argues that despite the fact that proximate cause is often determined by juries, they probably
do not fully comprehend the issue.
217. IDAHO CODE § 51-118 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 47.1-27 (Michie 1995).
218. Misconduct, however, is defined to include negligence as well as unauthorizad, wnh fa
and abusive acts. See IDAHO CODE § 51-112; VA. CODE ANN. § 47.1-2(3).
219. See ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. § 312f7-102 (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 486.360 (West
1995); Nay. REV. STAT. ANN. § 240.150(2) (Michie 1997); W. VA. CODE § 29C-6-102 (1995).
220. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-941 (1994).
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one similar transaction.22 This language mirrors the language in the
Model Notary Act, and is reminiscent of the holding in Commercial
Union.2
The Oregon statute provides that the notary's employer is liable to the
notary for all damages recovered from the notary based on official
misconduct if it was coerced by threat of the employer and if the threat
was made in reference to the particular notarization.2' This statute is
narrower than Connecticut's since it requires coercion vis A vis a
particular transaction, whereas the Connecticut statute imposes liability
for mere encouragement of notary misconduct which can be implied
from previous actions.
Florida's statute is unique among all others by relying on pure agency
principles. It imposes liability on employers for harm that is proximately
caused by notary employee misconduct as long as the notary acts within
the scope of employment at the time the misconduct occurs.224
All of the state statutes, except Florida's, require an employer to
consent to, know of, or coerce the notary misconduct before it will incur
liability for notary employee misconduct. Such a provision in essence
requires the employer to be a tortfeasor itself before being held
accountable for a notary employee's negligence. An employer who
knows of or consents to notary misconduct arguably breaches a duty of
care owed to those who will later rely on the notarized document, even
where the employer does not affimnatively act so as to cause the harm.2n
Those employers who coerce a notary employee to commit misconduct
could be viewed as grossly negligent or, under the appropriate facts,
could be found liable for fraud." 6 Thus, the current statutes, excepting
221. See id. Guam's provision is similar. See GUAM CODE ANN. § 33501(c) (1996).
Legislation has been introduced in Illinois that would revise its current employer liability provision
to include similar language. See H.B. 1452, 90th Gen. Assembly (Iii. 1997).
222. See MODENoTARYAC § 6-101(c); see also supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
223. See OR. REV. STAT. § 194.200 (1993). Recently, legislation has been proposed in
Oregon that would grant notary employees immunity from negligence actions based on acts or
omissions occurring on the job. Employers would remain vicariously liable for the misconduct.
See H.B. 2216, 68th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Or. 1995).
224. See FLA. STAT. ch. 117.05(7) (1995).
225. See generally GLANNON, supra note 216, at 62. "Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do." Id. at 62 (quoting Blyth v. Proprietors of the Birmingham Waterworks, 156 Eng. Rep.
1047, 1049 (Ex. 1856) (Alderson, B.)). The excerpt makes clear that nonfeasance can give rise to
liability in negligence.
226. Gross negligence typically involves reckless disregard or indifference to a plaintiff,
where the defendant's act represents "a substantial deviation below the standard of care expected
to be maintained by a reasonably careful person under like circumstances." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 6:703(9); 1191(A)(2) (West Supp. 1997). Some courts use the terms willful and wanton to
describe gross negligence. See State v. Wilcox, 337 P.2d 797, 801 (Or. 1959). Fraud is a "material
misrepresentation of past or existing facts, made with knowledge (scienter) or reckless ignorance
of this falsity, which cause (sic) a reliance upon these representations, to the detriment of the person
so relying." Coffey v. Wininger, 296 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973).
[Vol. 50:23
NOTARY EMPLOYEES
Florida's, should not be termed vicarious liability statutes, since the type
of employer involvement they call for could give rise to an independent
tort action against the employer. In short, the knowledge, consent, and
coercion requirements shield employers in a way that vicarious liability
does not. 7 Only the Florida statute relies on standard agency principles
to impose employer liability.
V. ANALYSIS
It is the thesis of this Article that employers should be held
accountable for notary employee misconduct through the application of
agency principles. The preceding discussion of existing case law and
statutes is a necessary backdrop to this thesis, because it exposes flaws
in analysis and poor policy choices made by those authorities that reject
agency theory. This section of the Article will discuss those flaws and
policy choices, will propose sensible common-law and statutory models
to impose vicarious liability for workplace notary misconduct, and will
suggest measures that can be taken by employers to lessen the impact of
the proposed liability.
A. The Shortcomings of Existing Common Law
Cases holding in favor of notary employers can be challenged in two
respects. First, some of those cases reason that notary employees are
public officers who are beyond the control of their private employers.
Only half of that statement is correct: Although notaries are public
officers, it does not necessarily follow that they are not subject to the
control of their employers. Second, the pro-employer case law tends to
merge, and thus confuse, issues of agency and negligence. A proper
approach to notary employee misconduct demands that the notary's
negligence and the employer's vicarious liability be analyzed separately.
May v. Jones"8 illustrates the initially appealing argument that the
public official status of notaries makes it impossible for them to be
controlled by their employers. The idea seems to be that a notary
employee wears one hat while performing routine employment duties but
removes that hat and replaces it with another the moment a notary
service is performed. The argument suggests that because the employer
cannot control the employee whenever the notary hat is in place, the
employee is not a servant when performing notary work. Common sense
dictates otherwise.
The public officer rationale ignores significant differences between
most public officials and notaries. In order to hold a public office a
three-part test must generally be met: the person must have authority
conferred by law, must serve for a set term, and must have the power to
227. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
228. 14 S.E. 552 (Ga. 1891); see supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
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exercise a power of the sovereign government.229 Public officers are
often classified into four groups: executive, legislative, judicial, or
ministerial. 2 ° Regardless of category, the term public officer generally
brings to mind an individual who is engaged in full-time public
employment." A notary, although a public officer under the three-part
test,232 is distinguishable from other public officers in an important
respect. Notaries are needed to authenticate commercial documents so
these documents can be relied upon by others. Throughout American
history, notaries have been immersed in the world of private enterprise,
not the world of government. This peculiarly private and commercial
aspect of the notary function is what undoubtedly led the Transamerica
court to state that notaries are only "quasi-public" officers.233
The common law should not ignore the commercial function of
notaries in such a way that employers are shielded from vicarious
liability. This is so not simply because notaries perform their work in
the world of business rather than the world of government. It is
additionally significant that notary employers gain a private advantage
from having notaries on staff. The advantage might be one of enhancing
a company's goodwill or promoting office efficiency and customer
convenience. It is inescapable that the notary's private employer, in
addition to the public, is benefitted by having notaries on staff. If an
employee performs a notary service at work which is authorized by the
employer and which benefits the employer in some way, the law of
agency should be applied if, through notary negligence, a third party is
harmed. The advantage that accrues to an employer suggests that
authorized notary work occurs in the scope of the notary's employ-
ment.234
For a master-servant relationship to exist, however, an employer must
control its notary employee. When notaries are properly recognized as
functioning in the world of commerce, and when the benefit they bestow
on their employers is acknowledged, it becomes unrealistic to argue that
notaries are not subject to the control of their employers when
performing notary services. It is not unusual for an employer to
determine the type of notary services a notary employee can render as
well as when those services may be performed. And, in many cases, it
is the employer who pays all the fees associated with a notary's
commission. Directing the availability of notary services and
subsidizing them are certainly aspects of control, despite the fact that the
229. See Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 875 (Conn. 1975) (holding that a public
defender, when representing a client, is not a public officer protected by sovereign immunity).
230. See People v. Salsbury, 96 N.W. 936,940 (Mich. 1903).
231. See generally 67 C.J.S. Officers § 7 (1978).
232. A notary serves a set term, exercises authority that is conferred by a state's constitution
or statutes, and performs ministerial duties.
233. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 462 P.2d 814, 817 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1969); see also supra text accompanying notes 142-55.
234. See supra Part l1.B.
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notary function is also a public one. While it may be true that an
employer cannot control a notary's official act, an employer has the
opportunity to control, and often does control, many other work-related
procedures directly touching on notary services.3 5 Further, surety case
law and the law of agency recognize that it is possible for a servant to
serve two masters simultaneously 36 Therefore, the argument that the
public officer status of notaries prevents employers from being liable for
job-related notary misconduct is based on an unrealistic view of notaries
and how they are utilized in the workplace.
A second and perhaps more subtle flaw in some of the cases rejecting
vicarious liability is seen in vague rationales that intermingle concepts
of agency and negligence. Consider in particular the New Jersey
Supreme Court's opinion in Commercial Union." In ruling in the
notary employer's favor, the court not only focused on the public officer
status of the notary employee but also emphasized the plaintiff's lack of
reliance on the bank employer?3 8 The fact that the notary misconduct
did not occur as part of a bank transaction disturbed the court, even
though the act took place on bank premises during bank business
hours3 9 The incidental aspect of the notary service led the court to find
that the plaintiff did not rely on the notary's employer.240 The court
failed, however, to explain how a plaintiff's lack of reliance fit within
the cause of action, leaving us to determine whether reliance on a
notary's employer is crucial to the agency analysis or whether it is
necessary to demonstrate the negligence of the notary. Although the
former resolution represents the more persuasive reading of the case, the
court is not clear. Despite this ambiguity, Commercial Union's reliance
rationale suggests that a plaintiff must demonstrate some sort of reliance
on the notary's employer rather than on the notarization before vicarious
liability will be imposed.
This analysis should be contrasted with that of Transamerica
Insurance, where the court engaged in a straightforward application of
the scope of employment test in order to determine whether the bank
employer could be liable for its notary employee's misconduct.24' The
plaintiffs reliance on the bank was not even mentioned, let alone
determinative. Reliance is also not key under the Restatement, where the
essence of vicarious liability is employer control and activity that occurs
within the scope of employment. The absence of a reliance analysis
from Transamerica and the Restatement is telling, suggesting that
235. See Gottschalk, supra note 11 at 522.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 127-37.
238. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burt Thomas-Aitken Constr., 230 A.2d 498,500-01
(NJ. 1967).
239. See iL at 499-500.
240. See id
241. See Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank. 462 P.2d 814, 815-19 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1969); supra text accompanying notes 142-55.
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reliance should not be analyzed as part of an agency determination.
Reliance is, however, discussed in other cases, but in different ways.
In Iselin-Jefferson Financial Co., liability was imposed on the notary
employer in part because the plaintiff relied on the notary's certificate.242
And, in Independence Leasing Corp., the court remanded the case to
allow the plaintiff to prove that it relied on the notary's actions.243 Both
cases require a plaintiff to allege reliance on the notary's act rather than
on the notary's employer. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the
reliance-on-employer focus in Commercial Union.
Iselin-Jefferson and Independence Leasing share one similarity with
Commercial Union, however: They fail to discuss exactly how the
plaintiff's reliance on the notary misconduct fits within the overall cause
of action. Is it required to establish the agency relationship between the
employer and notary or something else? Unlike Commercial Union,
Iselin-Jefferson and Independence Leasing suggest that reliance is tied
to "something else," especially since the Iselin-Jefferson court accepted
the parties' stipulation that the employer was vicariously liable for the
notary's misconduct,2" and the Independence Leasing court similarly
felt that the negligence of the bank was demonstrated.245
The reliance issue is quickly resolved by looking to private notary and
surety cases. In nearly all such cases, the plaintiff is required to allege
that a notary made a negligent or false certificate and that the plaintiff
relied upon the certificate.216 In American Surety Co. v. Boden,247 the
court stated that notaries owe a duty to persons other than those to whom
they directly render a service.248 Because the public, in general,
rightfully relies on notary certificates, recovery can be had if a person
suffers injury that is proximately caused by the notary's misconduct.249
The Boden court saw reliance on a notary certificate as a fundamental
principle of notary law by stating that "[a] certificate of acknowledgment
is an act which must, in the nature of things, be relied on with
confidence" by business persons.25 °
242. See Iselin-Jefferson Financial Co. v. United California Bank, 549 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1976);
supra text accompanying notes 156-66.
243. See Independence Leasing Corp. v. Aquino, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1007 (Erie Co. Ct.
1986); supra text accompanying notes 175-82.
244. See Iselin-Jefferson Financial Co. v. United California Bank, 549 P.2d at 143.
245. See Independence Leasing Corp. v. Aquino, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
246. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v. Hammett, 203 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
This is not always the rule, however. Where a statute allows suit to be brought against a notary and
surety by anyone injured by the notary's misconduct, reliance need not be shown. The plaintiff
must still prove proximate cause, however. See I In Hammett, the executor of a grantor's estate
was allowed to sue a notary and his surety where the notary allegedly induced the grantor to deed
property to him. The court held that the lack of any reliance on the deed certificate by the grantor's
executor did not bar the suit. See id
247. 50 S.W.2d 10 (Ky. 1932).
248. See id at 13.
249. See id
250. Id. (quoting Annotation, Liability of Notary Public or His Bond, 18 A.L.R. 1302, 06
(1922)).
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Cases such as Boden make clear that a plaintiff's reliance on an
invalid notarization should be considered within the negligence case
brought against the notary. In doing so, some courts discuss reliance in
relation to proximate cause. In Commonwealth ex rel. Smolovitz v.
American Surety Co., for example, the court discussed the plaintiffs'
reliance on a notarized affidavit in connection with its discussion of
causation.25 Similarly, inAmeriseal v. Leiffer, a case that was appealed
on the sole issue of proximate cause, the court emphasized the plaintiff's
affidavit, which stated that the plaintiff's harm resulted from its reliance
on the notary's affidavit. 52 By pointing to the plaintiffs' reliance upon
improper notarizations, these courts in effect tie reliance to
foreseeability." 3
Although reliance may be relevant to proximate cause, it can also be
considered within a duty analysis. Courts are often less than clear in
distinguishing between duty and proximate cause, but the concept of
duty is often used to limit liability even where harm is foreseeable.'
Couched in terms of duty, a notary's liability for negligence in
performing a notary service should require, in part, that the notary owe
a duty of care to the plaintiff. If a plaintiff has relied on a notary's
actions, and if that reliance is reasonably foreseeable to the notary, a
court should determine that the notary owed the plaintiff a duty of care.
In holding that a notary's duty is not limited to those persons to whom
the notary directly renders service, Boden expressly places reliance
within a duty analysis." Additionally, the Boden court's discussion of
reliance is notably distinct from its analysis of proximate cause,
indicating that reliance should be considered apart from causation.
Whether reliance on a notary certificate is a determinant for
proximate cause or the defendant's duty, the result is ultimately the
same: Harm resulting from notary misconduct that is foreseeable will
be compensable only if a plaintiff can show reliance on the notarization.
The reliance element, then, functions to limit recovery, and although it
may be analyzed as part of duty or proximate cause in a notary
negligence action, reliance has no place in determining whether an
employer is liable for the notary's misconduct. That determination
251. See Commonwealth ex rel. Smolovitzv. American Surety Co., 149 A.2d 515 61a. Super.
Ct. 1959); supra text accompanying notes 188-95.
252. See Ameriseal, Inc. v. Leiffer, 673 So. 2d 68, 69-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); supra
text accompanying notes 199-212.
253. Courts may rely on foreseeability when considering proximate caue, limiting liability
to those harms that are the foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence. See, e.g, White
v. Whiddon, 670 So. 2d 131, 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the foresecability of
intervening causes in relation to proximate cause); Murphy v. Wometco Cable T.V., 478 S.E.2d
398,399 (Ga. Ct App. 1996) (noting that issues of foreseeability are related to proximate cause);
see also GLANNON, supra note 216, at 182-83.
254. See Dickey v. Royal Banks, 11 F.3d 580, 584 (8 " Cir. 1997); see also GLAMO,4, supra
note 216, at 182-83. Glannon states that a duty determination is often made on policy grounds,
citing Pasgrafv. Long IslandRailroaL 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
255. See American Surety Co. v. Boden, 50 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Ky. 1932).
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should be resolved by resorting to the traditional agency concepts of
employer control and scope of employment.
B. A Common-Law Model
To correct the shortcomings of existing case law, a realistic and clear
common-law rule should be adopted. The rule would impose a two-step
analysis to any vicarious liability case involving notary employee
misconduct. A plaintiff would first have to demonstrate that the notary
had, in fact, committed misconduct. In the absence of a statute, a court
might well engage in a traditional tort analysis to determine if the notary
should be liable for the harm. Both duty and proximate cause would be
pivotal elements in this analysis; the focus, however, would be on
whether the notary breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff and, if
so, whether the notary's negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's harm. A plaintiff's reliance on the notary's certificate might
be required to demonstrate that the notary owed the plaintiff a duty of
care. The proximate cause analysis would then focus on the
foreseeability of the plaintiff's harm. In the alternative, the plaintiff's
reliance on the notarization might be considered within the proximate
cause analysis. In any event, causation would be analyzed with the
understanding that the notary misconduct need not be the sole cause of
the plaintiffs harm.256
The second part of the analysis would require that, at the time of the
misconduct, the notary was subject to the control of the employer and
acted within the scope of employment. Courts should realistically look
at notary employees and find that employer control exists and that the
scope of employment test is met where appropriate. An expansive view
of control should be applied, one that looks beyond the ability of the
employer to control the performance of the notary act itself and instead
inquires whether the employer controlled the availability of the notary
services. Further, an employer's provision of notary services to
customers should not hastily be dismissed as "incidental," leading to a
failure under the scope of employment test.257 Certainly the provision
of notary services, which are often required to complete certain
transactions, is not incidental. Additionally, only traditional agency
principles should be applied at this juncture in the analysis, avoiding any
consideration of the plaintiff's reliance on the employer.
The proposed model would arguably lead to increased employer
liability, but would have the advantage of clarifying existing law by
bifurcating the agency and underlying notary misconduct determinations.
It would additionally provide plaintiffs, notaries, and employers with a
predictable rule of law that reflects the realities of the workplace.
256. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Smolovitz v. American Surety Co., 149 A.2d at 517.
257. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bert Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 209 A.2d 155,
157 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965).
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Vicarious liability would not be automatic, however. An employer could
escape liability if a notary employee did not commit misconduct or if
proximate cause was not demonstrated; liability would also be avoided
if an agency relationship did not exist, or if the misconduct did not occur
in the scope of employment.
C. Statutory Protection and Proposed Revision
Existing statutes, with the exception of Florida's, fail to recognize the
benefits bestowed upon employers by their notary staff. Instead, the
statutes ignore those benefits and shield employers from liability unless
the employers engage in tortious conduct themselves. A well-drafted
statutory scheme would impose liability on employers for notary
employee misconduct by resorting to standard agency principles, but
only when the plaintiff can initially demonstrate that a misconduct action
can be pursued against the notary.
Many statutes impose liability on notaries and their sureties for
misconduct, 25 which is often defined to include intentional misconduct
as well as negligence. 9 Further, the statutes recognize a broad-based
reliance on notary certificates by allowing recovery by "any person" who
can show harm that is proximately caused by the misconduct.2" As
such, current statutes reflect a commendable policy decision that the
public's need for reliable notary services justifies the imposition of
broad-based liability on negligent notaries and their sureties. In effect,
the statutes recognize the public's reliance on notary certificates and
establish a corresponding duty of care on notaries.
Many of the same state codes that liberally impose liability on
notaries provide a significant amount of protection for employers by
requiring them to know of, consent to, or coerce notary employee
misconduct before they can be held vicariously liable. Such statutes are
the likely result of lobbying by politically strong notary employers such
as banks and law firms. For the reasons already discussed, it is unfair to
bestow upon employers this type of statutory protection since it allows
them to control the availability of on-site notary services and reap the
benefits with virtually no strings attached. The statutes almost
encourage employers to become oblivious to shoddy notary practices to
the ultimate detriment of the public. From a policy standpoint, these
statutes are unwise.
A sensible and fair statutory cause of action imposing vicarious
liability would address these concerns. State legislatures should codify
employer liability for notary employee misconduct where employer
258. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.50.160 (Michic 1996); CAL. Gov. CODE § 8214 (Derring
1996).
259. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-94a(7) (1994); 5 ILL COMP. STAT. 312/7-104 (West
1996).
260. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-941(a) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 51-118(1) (1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 46-1-15 (1996).
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control is shown and where the scope of employment test is met. An
ideal statutory model would first provide a cause of action for any per-
son who suffers harm that is proximately caused by notary misconduct.
Misconduct should be defined to include intentional acts as well as
professional negligence. Aggrieved parties should be able to bring an
action against the notary and the notary's surety. Most important, a
separate provision should impose vicarious liability on the notary's
employer if, at the time of the misconduct, the notary's services were
subject to the employer's control and occurred in the scope of employ-
ment.
The proposed legislative scheme would focus first on the notary's
liability, requiring a showing of misconduct and proximate cause.
Unlike the common-law proposal, there would be no need to consider the
plaintiff's reliance on the notary certificate as part of a duty determina-
tion, since the availability of an action to any person harmed by the mis-
conduct would reflect a legislative decision that notaries owe a duty to
the public in general. 6 If reliance were to have any place within this
statutory scheme, it would be solely within the proximate cause analysis.
Assuming a misconduct action against the notary could go forward, the
employer could then be sued under the separate vicarious liability pro-
vision, focusing solely on employer control and scope of employment.
From a policy standpoint, the suggested statutory model recognizes
that notary services are both commercial and public. It also provides a
clear framework for a court to follow when suit is brought against a
notary, a surety, and an employer. The proposal differs from any of the
current statutory provisions, although it most closely resembles Florida's
statute. Nevertheless, the proposed scheme departs from Florida's law
by removing proximate cause from the vicarious liability provision,
instead placing all emphasis on proximate cause within the misconduct
action brought against the notary. Removing proximate cause from the
employer liability provision avoids possible confusion that could result
from statutes such as Florida's, pursuant to which courts might
incorrectly require a plaintiff to show that the employer's actions were
the proximate cause of the harm.
The statutory proposal, like the common-law model, would enlarge
the scope of employer liability, forcing employers to control the quality
of the notary services that they make available to their customers. The
ways in which employers might do so are considered below.
D. Suggestions for Notary Employers
Employers can take a number of steps to lessen the likelihood that
they will be sued for the misconduct of their notary employees.
261. See State exreL Nelson v. Hammett, 203 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947); see also
supra text accompanying note 246. Some courts may, however, choose to discuss reliance in
relation to proximate cause. See supra text accompanying notes 251-53.
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Generally, a greater involvement in the notary services they provide is
the most efficient way for employers to protect themselves from liability.
Workplace education is the most obvious, and perhaps the most
beneficial, form of protection. Employers first need to educate
themselves about the notary profession. Not only can this be a valuable
first step toward the avoidance of vicarious liability, but basic education
may also help prevent suits brought against employers for their own
negligence regarding notary work.262 Education is of special benefit to
lawyers, who may face disciplinary action if notary services related to
the practice of law are mishandled.263 Once sensitized to notary
procedures, employers will likely have greater respect for their notary
employees and the notary work performed on the premises, and will have
an incentive to ensure that their employees are adequately educated.
Employers need to educate not only their notary staff, but also any
other employees who are involved in transactions where notary services
might be called for. Employee education should encompass the notary
process and state law requirements, and should ideally result in the
development of a standard office procedure for notary services. Any
such procedure must strive for consistency and should be governed by
clear guidelines regarding the type of notary services allowed at the
workplace.
Education can be furnished in numerous ways and at little cost.
Employers can contact the proper state officials to receive printed
information about notary practice and procedure. Professional notary
organizations also publish valuable publications. In addition, employee
personnel materials, such as an office manual, can be revised to include
information on notary procedures.2" One employee might even be
designated the notary liaison and made responsible for monitoring office
notary services.
A uniform office notary procedure will help assure compliance with
state law. A team approach to notary work might also prove helpful,265
but at the very least all office notaries should be required to maintain
journals to record information regarding each notary service performed.
A notary's journal, which may be required by law,2 could prove
262. For example, notary employers may be liable for the negligent supervision of notary
employees. See RESTATEhiENT, supra note 1, § 213; see also Gottschalk, supra note 11, at 523.
263. See, e.g., In re West, 805 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1991) (approving a three-month suspension
from the practice of law for an attorney wo directed a staffnotary to notarize a forged litigation
document).
264. See DUKE NORDLINGER STERN & J0 ANN FELIX-RETzKE, A PRACTiCAL GUIDE TO
PREvENNG LEGAL MALPRACrCE 105-06 (1983).
265. For example, a notary might be required to complete each certificate in the presence of
a co-worker. Cf Paul G. Ulich & Suzanne P. Clarke, Professional Responsibility, In 2 WORKING
wITHLEGALAssIsTAnS: ATEAM APPROACH FORLAwYERs AN LEGAL ASSISTANTS §§ 14A, 14.5
(Paul G. Ulrich & Robert S. Mucklestone, eds. 1981).
266. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-319 (1996); CAL. Gov. CODE § 8206(a) (West 1992 &
Supp. 1997); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 240.120(1) (Michie 1995). See generally FAERBER, supra
note 32.
1998]
MAINE LAWREVIEW
invaluable in the event a lawsuit is brought against the employer at a
later time. If an office notary liaison has been designated, that individual
might also be responsible for overseeing office notary procedures,
including journal maintenance.
Employers should also strive to hire notaries who are committed to
their public office. When interviewing candidates for positions that will
entail notary work, employers should question applicants about their
knowledge of and dedication to notary work. Employers should also
stress their own commitment to providing quality notary services to their
customers. Hiring only those notaries who are committed to performing
quality notary work is yet another way to lessen the prospect of liability.
The proposed scheme for vicarious liability and the foregoing
workplace suggestions will impose new costs on employers, but having
employers shoulder the burden for the work-related negligence of notary
staff is both fair and efficient. The fundamental fairness of imposing
employer liability has already been discussed at length, but at least one
other legal principle supports liability. It is axiomatic that when harm
must fall on one of two innocents, the law will choose the one who "set
the wrong in motion." 67  Because a plaintiff may not be fully
compensated by the notary and surety,268 either the innocent plaintiff or
the notary's employer could feasibly be responsible for the compensation
shortfall. Because the employer set the cause in motion by allowing
notary services to be performed by notary employee' the employer
should be liable for the damage.
Further, of the plaintiff and the employer, the employer is ti.e cheapest
cost avoider.26 9  As already indicated, employers can monitor notary
services at little cost and can insure themselves against notary employee
misconduct.27 On the other hand, potential plaintiffs can internalize
damage from invalid notarizations only by engaging in a costly
verification of every notary certificate upon which they rely. Basic
economic theory dictates that the employer should shoulder the burden.
267. Concordia Lutheran Evangelical Church v. United States Cas. Co., 115 A.2d 307, 309
(D.C. 1955) (holding that a party who signed blank checks that were later stolen must bear the loss
when the thief later brought the checks to a bank that cashed them); see also Books v. Ready Mix
Concrete Co., 96 S.E.2d 213,215 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956) (holding that damage from blasting falls on
the party who set the force in motion, despite the lack of fault).
268. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
269. The cheapest cost avoider is defined as the person "for whom the safety cost would be
the least" Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Dangerous Products and Injured Bystanders, 81 Ky. L.J. 687,
708 (1992-93) (citing Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 69,84-85 (1975)).
270. Although there may be some dispute as to whether an employer's general liability
insurance policy will cover notary-employee misconduct, an employer can easily protect itself by
purchasing notary errors and omissions insurance for very little cost. Interview with Milton 0.
Valera, President, National Notary Association, and Deborah M. Thaw, Executive Director,
National Notary Association, in Pittsburgh, Pa. (Nov. 26, 1997). In California, a notary-employce
can be insured for $10,000 for an annual premium of under $20. Comprehensive policies that cover
employers and all the notaries on staff are also available. See Id.
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An easy answer is to say that notary employees are the cheapest cost
avoiders since they are in the best position to avoid their own
misconduct. The law already recognizes this by providing for a primary
cause of action against notaries. Because plaintiffs might not be fully
compensated by suing the notaries and sureties, however, employers
should also be accountable for a plaintiff's harm.
VI. CONCLUSION
A review of the common law and statutes governing employer liability
for notary employee misconduct reveals a split of authority. Often the
law provides unwarranted protection for employers. Those employers
who utilize notary employees for the benefit of their business should face
liability for notary misconduct based on agency law rather than be
shielded by existing precedent and statutes.
Ideal models for common-law and statutory approaches to vicarious
liability would require a plaintiff to demonstrate, first, that notary
misconduct occurred and that it was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's harm. The plaintiff should then be able to proceed against an
employer if the employer controlled the notary employee in relation to
the notary services and if the misconduct occurred in the scope of
employment.
The broadened scope of employer liability can best be addressed by
workplace education, the implementation of uniform notary procedures
at the office, and insurance. If followed, these suggestions would pay
worthwhile dividends. Employers would be more knowledgeable about
notary law and would be able to prevent notary misconduct at the
workplace for relatively little cost. The quality of workplace notary
services would also be enhanced, leading to perhaps the greatest benefit
of all-a greater confidence in notary work by those engaged in
commerce and by the public at large.
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